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I. INTRODUCTION

On November 5, 1996, California voters struck a severe blow to
affirmative action by approving Proposition 209 as an amendment to the
California Constitution.' Embodied as article I, section 31, the primary
thrust of the initiative provides that "[t]he state shall not discriminate
against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the
basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of
public employment, public education, or public contracting." 2 While
seemingly straightforward, section 31, like other constitutional
imperatives or prohibitions, may be easier to enunciate as a legal
principal than it is to apply in practice. The devil may be in the details,
and California courts have only begun to grapple with questions of
interpretation and the scope of section 31.
One thing is certain: Proposition 209 has survived a direct
constitutional challenge and is the law in California. In Coalitionfor
Economic Equity v. Wilson, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
the constitutionality of Proposition 209, stating: "That the Constitution
permits the rare race-based or gender-based preference hardly implies
that the state cannot ban them altogether. States are free to make or not
make any constitutionally permissible legislative classification.'
Although questions of interpretation remain, the overall effect of

1. Proposition 209 was approved by California voters by a fifty-four to forty-six
percent margin. Dave Lesher, Battle over Prop. 209 Moves to the Courts, L.A. TIMS,
Nov. 7, 1996, at AI.
2. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31.
3. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 711 (9th Cir. 1997)
(upholding the constitutionality of section 31 in the face of an equal protection
challenge); Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1083-84
(Cal. 2000) (holding the City of San Jose's women and minority outreach program
involving City contracts violative of section 31); Bd. of Educ. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 562, 563, 578 (Ct. App. 1998) (upholding the lower court's decision to expedite
termination of the court's involvement in the case, but disapproving of the court's
seeming reliance on section 31 as the grounds for doing so); Kidd v. State, 72 Cal. RPtr.
2d 758, 770, 772-73 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding the state's supplemental certification
affirmative action policy for civil service hiring violative of section 31).
4. Coalitionfor Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 711. The suit challenging Proposition
209 was filed in federal court on November 6, 1996, the day following the vote. Id. at
697.
5. Id. at 708. Relying on the "Hunter Doctrine," the plaintiffs in Coalition for
Economic Equity alleged that Proposition 209 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, contending "that Proposition 209 imposes an 'unequal political
structure' that denies women and minorities a right to seek preferential treatment from
the lowest level of government." Id. at 703.
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Proposition 209 is undoubtedly far reaching.6 This Comment will focus
on the potential effects of section 31 on public schools, an area that may
face unique challenges!
A. Proposition209 and Desegregation"Progranmsin Public Schools
This Comment will investigate section 31's possible impact on
primary and secondary public school programs, ranging from courtordered or court-supervised desegregation programs to voluntary school
choice and magnet programs. The inquiry is important because school
districts, unlike other public entities, have unique equal protection
obligations under the California Constitution to remedy racial isolation.
Fulfilling this duty, when it arises, is an inherently complicated and
costly task.'" School districts are dependent upon state and federal

6. In Hi-Voltage, the California Supreme Court held that a City of San Jose
outreach program geared toward increasing bidding opportunities for minority- and
women-owned businesses (MBEs and WBEs) violated section 31. 12 P.3d at 1083-84.
The program, which the City had modified after the effective date of section 31 in order
to comply with its proscriptions, requires contractors bidding on city projects to
demonstrate that they have not discriminated or given preference to any subcontractors
based on "race, sex, color, age, religion, sexual orientation, disability, ethnicity, or
national origin." Id. at 1070-71 & n.2. Under the program, contractors must fulfill
either an MBE or WBE participation or an outreach component in order for their bids to
be considered "responsive." Id. at 1071.
7. Although not addressed by this Comment, the effect of Proposition 209 (and
an earlier University of California Board of Regents resolution which ended admission
preferences) on affirmative action programs in the university admissions setting is also
of critical importance and is the subject of a lively debate among scholars. See WALTER
FEINBERG, ON IGHER GROUND: EDUCATION AND THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACnoN 116 (1998). See generallyWILUAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER:
LONG-TERi CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY
ADMISSIONS (1998) (discussing affirmative action); CHILLING ADMISSIONS: THE
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CRISIS AND THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES (Gary Orfield &

Edward Miller eds., 1998); Constance Hawke, Refrining the Rationalefor Affirmative
Action in Higher Education Admissions, 135 ED. LAW REP. 1 (1999) (providing an
overview of the debate surrounding affirmative action).
8. The terms "integration" and "desegregation" should be read as being
functionally equivalent. Both terms are employed because courts generally refer to the
duty to desegregate, while school districts usually refer to the process as integration. The
use of one or the other term is context-driven and is not intended to imply any difference
in meaning.
9. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7. See also infra Part lI.B.
10. E.g., CHRISTINE H. ROSSELL, THE CARROT OR THE STICK FOR SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION POLICY: MAGNET SCHOOLS OR FORCED BUSING 137-44 (1990)
(analyzing the logistics and costs associated with implementing magnet programs).

integration funding" to implement the programs necessary to carry this
duty out. With the enactment of section 31, school districts are
confronted with an additional variable that potentially makes their task
even more difficult. If section 31 were determined to be broadly
applicable to school integration programs, an affected school district
would be faced with the daunting task of having to fulfill its
constitutional duty to remedy racial isolation without resorting to
anything that could be construed as granting a racial preference.' 2
It is not the purpose of this Comment to rehash the relative merits of
section 31,3 or affirmative action" in general. Rather, the goal of this
Comment is simply to provide insight and guidance to policy makersparticularly at the school district level-who may be tasked with having
to reconcile their constitutional duty to remedy racial isolation with
section 31 's proscription against granting "racial preferences."
Part II provides a brief historical overview of federal and California
State equal protection jurisprudence as it relates to primary and
secondary public schools. Specifically, Part II will examine a school

11. California currently provides funding for school integration programs under
Education Code sections 42243.6 (providing guidelines for reimbursement of the costs
mandated by courts) and 42249 (providing guidelines for reimbursement of the volunatry
integration program costs). CAL EDUC. CODE §§ 42243.6, 42249 (West 1993 & Supp.
2000).
12. This is a worst case scenario which assumes that section 31 is applicable to all
school integration programs. As discussed infra Parts III-IV, section 31 almost certainly
does not reach court-ordered integration plans and, arguably, does not reach purely
voluntary plans either.
13. There is already an abundance of such analysis elsewhere. See generally
Martin D. Carcieri, A Progressive Reply to the ACLU on Proposition 209, 39 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 141 (1998) (discussing Proposition 209); Martin D. Carcieri, Operational
Need, Political Reality, and Liberal Democracy: Two Suggested Amendments to
Proposition 209-Based Reforms, 9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 459 (1999) (suggesting
amendments to Proposition 209); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Impact of the Proposed
CaliforniaCivil Rights Initiative, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 999 (1996) (assessing the
impact of the California Civil Rights Initiative); Eugene Volokh, The California Civil
Rights Initiative: An Interpretive Guide, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1335 (1997) (reviewing the
impact of the California Civil Rights Initiative); Note, The Constitutionality of
Proposition 209 as Applied, 11l HARV. L. REV. 2081 (1998) (reviewing the
constitutionality of Proposition 209).
14. For a sample of recent books and articles on the subject of affirmative action,
see CHILLING ADMISSIONS, supra note 7; TERRY EASTLAND, ENDING AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION: THE CASE FOR COLORBLIND JUSTICE (1996); FEINBERG, supra note 7; PAUL
CRAIG ROBERTS & LAWRENCE M. STRATTON, THE NEW COLOR LINE: How QUOTAS AND

PRIVILEGE DESTROY DEMOCRACY (1995); Kimberle Crenshaw, Playing Race Cards:
Constructing a Pro-Active Defense of Affirmative Action, 16 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 196
(1999-2000); Kathleen A. Graves, Comment, Affirmative Action in Law School
Admissions: An Analysis of Why Affirmative Action Is No Longer the Answer... Or Is
It?, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 149 (1998); David Gergen, Editorial, Becoming 'Race Savvy': The
End of Affirmative Action Brings Unexpectedly Drastic Results, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., June 2, 1997, at 78.
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district's obligations under the California Constitution to remedy
segregation or racial isolation-which is broader than that imposed
under the Federal Constitution. 5 Part III addresses the possible effects
of section 31 on court-ordered or court-supervised integration programs.
This is the easiest of the questions posed and, as will be shown, the
answer is that section 31 should have no effect on programs in this
16
category. Part III also addresses whether section 31 forecloses all use
of "preferences" in future remedial schemes in school desegregation
cases. In cases where a court determines that the use of preferences is
necessary to fulfill a school district's constitutional obligations, it is
clear that the application of section 31 to prevent such a remedy would
itself run afoul of the Federal Constitution. ' The same reasoning applies
to the use of preferences arising under a consent decree, although it is
likely that some sort of findings would be necessary to substantiate the
need for the remedy.
Finally, Part IV addresses the more difficult question of whether the
use of racial criteria in purely voluntary programs, such as school choice
and magnet programs, falls within the reach of section 31. As for
voluntary programs already in place at the effective date of the initiative,
the answer again, is that section 31 should have no effect.'" However,
voluntary programs initiated or modified after the effective date of the
initiative may indeed be threatened by section 31. It is a close call; there
is authority both for and against the inclusion of such voluntary
programs within the scope of section 31. The easiest argument to
articulate is probably that these programs are within the scope of section
31, since this result hews more closely to the language, intent, and
underlying policy of the section. However, there are compelling reasons
why section 31 should not be given this effect, and there is at least some
indication that courts may be willing to impliedly exempt school
integration efforts from its provisions. 9 In any event, school districts
faced with implementing new programs or modifying pre-existing
programs should tread carefully and assume that section 31 may be
triggered.
15. See infra Part II.B. (noting that California schools have an affirmative
constitutional duty to remedy segregation-regardless of its cause).
16. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(d).
17. Volokh, supra note 13, at 1387. Volokh only addresses this issue vithin the
context of federal courts. See also infra Part I1.B.

18.

CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(b).

19.

See infra Part III.

To provide context, this analysis will trace the experience of one
California school district, the San Diego Unified School District
(SDUSD). SDUSD's experience typifies the process: as it first came
under court order to redress racial isolation within the district; later, as it
developed a voluntary integration plan; and finally, as its integration
plan came under attack on the grounds that certain elements of the

program violated section 31.20

II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A. Court-EnforcedDesegregation Under the FederalConstitution
In the landmark decision Brown v. Board of Education,' the Supreme
Court held that racial segregation of public schools violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 In so doing, the
Court laid to rest the infamous "separate but equal" doctrine first
enunciated in Plessy v. Ferguson, concluding that "[s]eparate
educational facilities are inherently unequal."'
However, Brown's
immediate effect on school desegregation efforts was not as profound as
one might imagine. While Brown established the necessary legal
principle that segregated schools were "inherently unequal" and thus
violated the Equal Protection Clause," the Court provided little guidance
as to what steps an affected school district must take to fulfill its
constitutional duty. 26 One year later, the Court provided scant additional
guidance when it announced in its subsequent decision, also captioned
Brown v. Board of Education, 7 that desegregation should proceed "with
all deliberate speed. 28
Lacking clear guidance from the Supreme Court, the means of
implementing Brown's mandate were left to federal district courts in the
South.2 ' These courts immediately came under immense local political

20. See infra Part II.C.
21. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (hereinafter Brown I).
22. Id. at 495.
23. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
24. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495. The Brown I holding was limited to segregation in a
public school setting, id., but was to have a profound effect on other areas, such as
housing, employment, and higher education, and, in a very real sense, started the civil
rights revolution. GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION:
THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN v. BOARD OFEDUCATION 7 (1996).

25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
26. ORFIELD & EATON, supra note 24, at 7.
27. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (hereinafter Brown ll).
28. Id. at 301.
29. ORFIELD & EATON, supra note 24, at 7.
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pressure from opponents to desegregation.'

As a result, desegregation

cases were subject to long delays and judicial action was generally
limited to enforcing minor changes."' Consequently, the segregated
character of education in the South remained generally intact for more
than a decade following the Brown decisions.2 In the North, where
segregation took on a different character, serious desegregation efforts
did not take place until the mid-1970s."
It was not until the Court's decisions in Green v.Count School Board
(1968),3 Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education (19711,"
and Keyes v. Denver School DistrictNo. 1 (1973)' that the Court added
"teeth" to the Brown mandate by establishing definitive guidelines and a

remedial framework for school desegregation.
Under this modem remedial framework, upon a judicial finding of de
jure segregation,37 the affected school district must eliminate any prior
discriminatory practices, and is further charged with the -affirmative
duty to take all steps necessary to eliminate the vestiges of the
unconstitutional de jure system." ' Lest there be any doubt about the
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 7-8.
34. 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) (holding that schools must dismantle segregated
systems "root and branch" and that segregation must be achieved with respect to
facilities, staff, faculty, extracurricular activities, and transportation).
35. 402 U.S. 1, 15, 30 (1971) (holding that formerly segregated schools are

"charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps [including busing that] might
be necessary to convert to a unitary system" (citing Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38) I.
36. 413 U.S. 189, 201-03 (1973) (holding that school districts are responsible for
policies such as constructing schools in racially isolated neighborhoods and
gerrymandering attendance zones that result in racial segregation).
37. De jure segregation is defined as "[g]enerally refer[ing] to segregation directly
intended or mandated by law or otherwise issuing from an official racial
classification ....[The t]erm comprehends any situation in which the activities of
school authorities have had a racially discriminatory impact ..." BLCK's L.w
DICTnONARY 425 (6th ed. 1990).
38. Bradley W. Joondeph, Note, Killing Brown Soft:" The Subtle Undermining of
Effective Desegregation in Freeman v.Pitts, 46 STAN. L. REv. 147, 149 (1993) (citing

Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 485 (1992)). Joondeph summarizes the court-ordered
desegregation process under the federal Constitution as follows:
The process of court-ordered desegregation begins with a finding that
discrimination by school officials has led to segregation in a school district.
Upon such a finding, the district court usually orders the school district to
schools. Ifthe
come forward with a comprehensive plan to desegregate its
court finds the school district's plan unsatisfactory, the court must devise such
a scheme itself. In either case, the school system is legally bound by the

scope and depth of a school district's responsibility to desegregate, the
Court in Swann candidly observed: "The remedy for such segregation
may be administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre in
some situations and may impose burdens on some."39 Clearly then,
lower courts were to use the full range of their equitable powers in
combating segregation.
While the Green, Swann, and Keyes trilogy fleshed out the scope of a
school district's duty to desegregate and provided a remedial framework
for fulfilling this duty, it also marked the high tide of the Court's judicial
activism in school desegregation cases."0 Following Keyes, the Court's
focus appeared to shift from rigorous enforcement of school
desegregation to one of judicial restraint. Beginning with Milliken v.
Bradley,"' the Court has demonstrated an unwillingness to expand the
scope of the duty to desegregate or the list of permissible remedies. 2
In Milliken, the Court struck down the use of an interdistrict
desegregation remedy employed in Detroit schools, holding that such a
remedy was impermissible unless it could be demonstrated that each of
the affected districts or the state had taken action which contributed to
segregation.4 ' This decision severely limited desegregation efforts in
northern cities where minorities are primarily clustered in dense innercity areas, surrounded by predominantly white suburbs." For its part,
the Rehnquist Court ' has demonstrated an increasing skepticism toward
desegregation plan, and the district court retains jurisdiction over the case until
the school district is fully desegregated. Once the school district believes it has
fulfilled its obligations under the court-ordered plan, it may petition the court
for a declaration that the school district has achieved "unitary status," and for
dissolution of the court's desegregation order. If the court finds that the school
district has successfully desegregated, it will return control of the system to
local authorities. Once declared unitary, the school district's constitutional
obligations are the same as those of any other nonsegregated school system.
Id. at 149-50 (internal citations omitted).
39. Swann, 402 U.S. at 28.
40. Joondeph, supra note 38, at 170.
41. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
42. Bradley W. Joondeph, A Second Redemption?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 169,
170 (1999).
43. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 745.
44. ORFIELD & EATON, supra note 24, at 10-11.
45. Chief Justice Rehnquist's personal support for desegregation efforts has been
tepid at best. As the sole dissenter in Keyes, Rehnquist stated:
The Court has taken a long leap in this area of constitutional law in
equating the district-wide consequences of gerrymandering individual
attendance zones in a district where separation of the races was never required
by law with statutes or ordinances in other jurisdictions which did so require.
It then adds to this potpourri a confusing enunciation of evidentiary rules in
order to make it more likely that the trial court will on remand reach the result
which the Court apparently wants it to reach. Since I believe neither of these
steps is justified by prior decisions of this Court, I dissent.
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the continuation of court-ordered desegregation remedies.'

As one

commentator noted:
This retreat [away from the Court's earlier activist stance in desegregation
cases] has been fueled, at least in part, by three recent Supreme Court
decisions-Boardof Education v. Dowell, Freeman %,.Pitts, and Missouri r.
Jenkins. Although not altering any fundamental legal principles, the decisions
evinced a clear hostility to the continuation of court-ordered desegregation
remedies. In each opinion, the Court emphasized that the judicial supervision of
formerly segregated school districts was intended to be temporary. and that
federal district courts should return control over public schools to politically
accountable local officials as soon as practicable.

Notwithstanding the Rehnquist Court's antipathy, the general remedial
scheme established by the Court in Green, Swann, and Ke'yes remains

largely in place."4 School districts continue to have a constitutional duty

to take affirmative steps to remedy desegregation upon a finding of de
jure segregation.
B. Court-EnforcedDesegregationUnder the CaliforniaConstitution

In 1976, the California Supreme Court outlined the broad duty under
the California Constitution to remedy segregation or racial isolation in
the landmark decision Crawfordv.Board of Education." In CraitfordI,
the court held that "school boards in California bear a constitutional

obligation to take reasonably feasible steps to alleviate school
segregation 'regardless of its cause."'"

The "regardless of its cause"

language is significant because it means that in California a school
district has an affirmative duty to remedy both de jure and de facto
413 U.S. at 265 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). One commentator has noted that "'although
Rehnquist accepted Brown in theory, he gave it a narrow interpretation and disagreed
with many of the later Supreme Court decisions that spelled out Brown's mandate."
ORFIELD & EATON, supra note 24, at 10. Interestingly, Rehnquist was a Supreme Court
clerk when Brown was decided and authored a memo which stated: "Irealize that it is an
unpopular and unhumanitarian position, for which I have been excoriated by 'liberal'
colleagues, but I think Plessy v. Ferguson was right and should be reaffirmed." Id.
Rehnquist later claimed that the memo expressed Justice Jackson's early views on Brown
rather than his own views on the matter. Id.
46. Joondeph, supranote 42, at 170.
47. Id. (internal citations omitted).
48. Id.
49. 551 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976) (hereinafter Craisford1).
50. Id.at 30 (citing Jackson v. Pasadena City Sch. Dist., 382 P.2d 878, 882 (Cal.
1963)). The court made it clear that its holding merely affirmed the court's earlier
decision in Jackson and its progeny. Id. at 33-34.

segregation." The court explained:
Given the fundamental importance of education, particularly to minority
children, and the distinctive racial harm traditionally inflicted by segregated
education, a school board bears an obligation, under article I, section 7,
subdivision (a) of the California Constitution, mandating the equal protection of
the laws, to attempt to alleviate segregated education and its harmful
such segregation results from the application of a facially
consequences, even5 if
neutral state policy. 2

As noted above, a school district's obligation under the federal
Constitution extends only to remedying de jure segregation." That is,
the duty is triggered only when the segregation is an outgrowth of the
activities or policies of the school authorities themselves. Consequently,
the constitutional burden facing school districts is more stringent under
the California Constitution than under the federal Constitution.,
This result was not altered by the passage of Proposition I in 1979.

Proposition I, embodied in article I, section 7 of the California
Constitution,55 limits the power of state courts to order busing and school
reassignment to that which is exercised by federal courts under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 In upholding the
constitutionality of Proposition I, the U.S. Supreme Court underscored
the different obligations under state and federal law. The Court stated:
[E]ven after Proposition I, the California Constitution still imposes a greater

51. Crawford 1, 551 P.2d at 33. De facto segregation is defined as "[slegregation
which is inadvertent and without assistance of school authorities and not caused by any
state action, but rather by social, economic and other determinates." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 416 (6th ed. 1990).
52. Crawford I, 551 P.2d at 39. De facto segregation generally refers to
segregation not caused by the school district itself. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 5 1. Thus, the language "resultsfrom the applicationof a facially neutral state
policy" should be construed to mean segregation which exists in the face of a neutral
state policy.
53. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1971).
54. Interestingly, the Crawford I court recognized that Swann and other recent
Supreme Court opinions held that the federal constitutional burden extended only to de
jure segregation. The court nonetheless concluded that the issue of whether a school
district's obligation under the Federal Constitution extends to combating purely de facto
segregation "remains an open question." Crawford,551 P.3d at 33.
55. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).
[Nit court of this state may impose upon the State of California or any public
entity, board, or official any obligation or responsibility with respect to the use
of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except to remedy a
specific violation by such party that would also constitute a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and (2) unless a federal court would be permitted under federal
decisional law to impose that obligation or responsibility upon such party to
remedy the specific violation of the Equal Protection Clause ....
Id.
56. Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 532 (1982) (hereinafter Crawford 11).

670

[VoL.38: 661, 2001]

Proposition209
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

duty of desegregation than does the Federal Constitution. The state courts of
California continue to have an obligation under state law to order segregated
school districts to use voluntary desegregation techniques, whether or not there
has been a finding of intentional segregation. The school districts themselves
retain a state-law obligation to take reasonably feasible steps to desegregate. and
they remain 57free to adopt reassignment and busing plans to effectuate
desegregation.

The California Supreme Court had previously reached the same
conclusion in McKinny v. Oxnard Union High School District,"' stating:
"the amendment [Proposition I] neither releases school districts from
their state constitutional obligation to take reasonably feasible steps to
alleviate segregation regardless of its cause, nor divests California courts

of authority to order desegregation measures other than pupil school
assignment or pupil transportation." 9

It should be recognized that, from a practical standpoint, the
continuing validity of the more stringent duty to desegregate under the

California Constitution may be in question.

Although Cranford I

remains good law and California school districts continue to have an
affirmative duty to remedy both de jure and de facto segregation," any
prescribed remedy must be limited to that which is allowed under federal

law. While California is free to construe its state law equal protection
duty as more stringent than that imposed

under the

Federal

Constitution,6' any remedial action is necessarily restricted by the
application of the Supremacy Clause and the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.63
57. ld. at 535-36 (emphasis added).
58. 642 P.2d 460 (Cal. 1982).
59. Id. at 467.
60. See supranotes 49-54 and accompanying text.
61. Bustop, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 439 U.S. 1380. 1382 (1978). At that time, Justice
Rehnquist stated:
mhe only authority that a federal court has to order desegregation or busing in
a local school district arises from the United States Constitution. But the same
is not true of state courts. So far as this Court is concerned, they are free to
interpret the Constitution of the State to impose more stringent restrictions on
the operation of a local school board.
was While I have the gravest doubts that the Supreme Court of California
was required by the United States Constitution to take the action that it has
taken in this case, I have very little doubt that it was permitted by that
Constitution to take such action.
Id. at 1382-83 (opinion in chambers on application for stay).
62. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

First in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. (1989)' and again in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (1995),65 the Supreme Court held
that any use of racial classifications by a state actor will be subject to
strict judicial scrutiny.' This means that even "benign" or "remedial"
racial classifications will be treated as suspect.67 In order to survive
strict scrutiny, the racial classification employed must serve a
"compelling governmental interest" and the means must be "narrowly
tailored" to accomplish that purpose.'
While neither Croson nor Adarand dealt directly with school
desegregation, lower federal courts have uniformly interpreted their
mandate as applicable to desegregation cases. In five recent decisions
involving the use of racial criteria in a public school setting, the lower
courts have uniformly subjected the programs in question to strict
scrutiny.' Consequently, it is presumptively clear that all such programs
will be subject to the highest level of judicial scrutiny in the future.
While some ambiguity remains as to what qualifies as a sufficiently
compelling governmental interest in order to survive strict scrutiny
analysis, at least four Supreme Court Justices have concluded that only a
remedial purpose involving de jure discrimination will suffice.7 It is at
least possible that courts may recognize furthering diversity as a
sufficiently compelling interest to survive strict scrutiny." However, it
64. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
65. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
66. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (holding that any use of racial classifications in state
and local affirmative action programs must withstand strict scrutiny analysis); Adarand,
515 U.S. at 227 (extending the Croson holding to include affirmative action programs
initiated by Congress).
67. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
68. Id. Commentators have described strict scrutiny analysis as being strict in
theory, fatal in fact. While this characterization is almost certainly true in cases
involving "invidious" discrimination, strict scrutiny should not always prove fatal in
cases involving benign classifications. In Adarand, Justice O'Connor took exception to
this notion, stating:
Finally, we wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory,
but fatal in fact." The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the
lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this
country is an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from
acting in response to it.... When race-based action is necessary to further a
compelling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it
satisfies the 'narrow tailoring' test this Court has set out in previous cases.
Id. at 237 (internal citations omitted).
69. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 129 (4th Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1420 (2000); Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 147
F.3d 854, 864 (9th Cir. 1998); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 794 (1st Cir. 1998);
Brewer v. West Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 32 F. Supp. 2d 619, 626 (W.D.N.Y. 1999);
Hunter v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 971 F. Supp. 1316, 1323 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
70. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
71. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-15 (1978) (Powell,
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is well settled that the objective of remedying societal discrimination or
segregation (i.e., de facto segregation) does not constitute a sufficiently
compelling interest.'
Consequently, while school districts have an
affirmative duty to remedy de facto segregation or racial isolation under

the California Constitution, any prescribed remedy is limited to that
which is allowable under federal law, which does not recognize
remedying de facto segregation as a sufficiently compelling interest to
survive strict scrutiny.3 Thus, California school districts would appear
to be in somewhat of a Catch-22.
C. Court-OrderedDesegregationin San Diego
It was under the CrawfordI standard that the court in Carlin v. Board
of Education74 ordered the San Diego Unified School District (SDUSD)
to present a plan to alleviate racial isolation and its harmful effects."
The ruling was based on a finding that twenty-three of the district's
schools were racially isolated."6 In August. 1977, the court approved the
district's voluntary integration plan" which included, among its many
provisions, the Voluntary Ethnic Enrollment Program (VEEP) and an
expanded Magnet School Program. 7" Thereafter, the court reviewed and

J.) (identifying diversity as a sufficiently compelling interest in a university admissions
setting); Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 918 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that there may ba
nonremedial justifications for employing racial classifications that could survive strict
scrutiny). But see Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 948-49 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that
only a remedial purpose in the face of de jure discrimination was a sufficiently
compelling interest).
72. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-15; Adarand,515 U.S. at 227.
73. Interestingly, commentary and case law is not to be found on this point. Given
the importance of school integration, a more searching analysis on this topic is
warranted. The point is simply raised here as being potentially significant, leaving it to
others to explore more fully.
74. Carlin v. Bd. of Educ., No. 303800 (Cal. Super. Ct., S. D. 1996) (final order
terminating court jurisdiction) (hereinafter Carlin 1). The Carlin class, representing
minority school children, originally brought suit against SDUSD in 1967. seeking to
compel the school district to integrate its schools. Id. at 2
75. Bd. of Educ. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 562, 56-64 Ct. App. 1998)
(describing historical context) (hereinafter Carlin 11).
76. 1&
77. ld. at 564. Although the district's integration plan was labeled -voluntary," it
should not be confused with purely voluntary plans which do not arise under a court
order or consent decree.
78. 1 S.D. UNIFIED SCH. DIST., SAN DIEGO PLAN r-OR RACIAL INTrEGRNTION, 153,
155 (1977).

approved the district's plan on an annual basis. 9
In 1980, a group of parents and students calling themselves
"Groundswell" successfully intervened in the suit. ° It appears that, at
least initially, Groundswell was only opposed to the mandatory
assignment of students based on race or ethnicity.8' However, over time,
Groundswell extended its opposition to include the district's use of race
as a factor in its school choice and magnet programs, and the court's
continued involvement in the case. 2
In 1985, after concluding that the district had made meaningful
progress, the court issued a final order which mandated that the various
programs in the district's integration plan remain in effect and required
the district to file annual reports with the court." The final order further
provided that the court would retain continuing jurisdiction in the case,
but would take further action only upon notice of motion for "good
cause shown."' Nearly a decade later, the court issued an amended final
order that made minor modifications to the integration plan and
reaffirmed the court's continuing jurisdiction in the case."
In 1992, and again in 1994, Groundswell filed motions asking the
court to discharge the writ of mandate and to issue an order for "final
approval" of the district's integration plan.86 In each instance, the court
denied Groundswell's motion.87 Finally, in January, 1996, the court
acquiesced and granted Groundswell's motion to discharge the writ 8 and
to issue an order for the final approval of the district's voluntary
integration plan.89 In granting Groundswell's motion:
The court observed [that] providing equal opportunity in schools had "become a
way of life" and over the years the court's role had evolved into a supervisory
role, with the District initiating its own changes. The court said it was time to
end its involvement and discharge the writ when jurisdiction ended,
commenting "it is not entirely proper for the appearance of the court of being
some sort of a lord of a democratic institution such as the school district for

79. Carlin I, No. 303800 at 2 (detailing the history of the court-ordered integration
plan).
80. Carlin II, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 563-64.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 564.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Petition for Writ of Mandate or Prohibition or Other Appropriate Relief;
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, at 4-5, Bd. of Educ. v.
Super. Ct. (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (No. 303800).
87. Id.
88. "Although the court orally stated it intended to discharge the writ, the order of
August 16, 1996, did not do so." Carlin H, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 564 n.2.
89. CarlinI, No. 303800, at 2.
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more than 28 years." 9

Following a hearing in late July, the court issued a "Final Order

Terminating Court Jurisdiction" which directed the district to maintain
its integration plan and broadly outlined the programs which were to be
continued under the plan.9' The final order also contained a sunset

provision which provided that "after January 1, 2000, the District's
failure to comply with any of the specific provisions of this Order will

not constitute a violation or contempt of this order.' "

Although the

court had orally stated that it intended to discharge the writ when it

originally granted Groundswell's motion, it failed to do so in the final
order.9 3 Groundswell's petitions for writ review of the order were denied

by both the intermediate appellate court and the California Supreme
Court.' Significantly, Groundswell did not actually appeal the order.'

Emboldened by the passage of Proposition 209, the "California Civil
Rights Initiative" (CCRI),9 Groundswell returned to court less than
90. CarlinII, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 564 (citing the court record).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 564 n.2. No explanation was given for the court's ultimate decision not
to discharge the writ.
94. Id. at 564.
95. Id.
96. CAL. CONsT. art. 1, § 31:
Discrimination based on race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin;
gender-based qualifications in public employment, education, or contracting
(a) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment
to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or
national origin in the operation of public employment, public education,
or public contracting.
(b)This section shall apply only to action taken after the section's
effective date.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting bona fide
qualifications based on sex which are reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as invalidating any court
order or consent decree which is in force as of the effective date of this
section.
(e) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting action which
must be taken to establish or maintain eligibility for any federal program,
where ineligibility would result in a loss of federal funds to the state.
(f) For the purposes of this section, "state" shall include, but not
necessarily be limited to, the state itself, any city, county, city and county.
public university system, including the University of California,
community college district, school district, special district, or any other
political subdivision or governmental instrumentality of or within the

seven months later in July, 1997, launching yet another assault on the
Specifically, Groundswell sought to
district's integration plan.97
eliminate the district's VEEP and school choice programs in order to
bring the district's integration plan into compliance with section 31, and
to terminate the court's jurisdiction in the case." The stage was thus set
for a potential confrontation between a court-ordered integration plan
and Proposition 209.
III. PROPOSITION 209

AND COURT-ORDERED
DESEGREGATION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

That Proposition 209 would immediately be used as a vehicle to attack
a court-ordered integration plan was by no means an obvious result of its
passage. The express terms of article I, section 3 1(d) would seem to put
court-ordered integration plans beyond its reach." The provision states:
"Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as invalidating any court
order or consent decree which is in force as of the effective date of this
section."' ' Eugene Volokh, who served as a legal advisor for the proProposition 209 campaign, wrote after its passage that clause (d)
"protects a specific, narrow category of settled expectations.""' In other
words, pre-existing court orders and consent decrees were expressly
exempted from the scope of the initiative. The legislative analyst's
report, found in the Proposition 209 ballot materials, addressed clause
(d) specifically within the context of public schools, stating simply: "It
[Proposition 209] would not... affect court-ordered desegregation
programs.""
As an aside, the exemption of existing consent decrees may have been
compelled by other constitutional considerations. The "narrow category
state.
(g) The remedies available for violations of this section shall be the same,
regardless of the injured party's race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national
origin, as are otherwise available for violations of then-existing California
antidiscrimination law.
(h) This section shall be self-executing. If any part or parts of this section
are found to be in conflict with federal law or the United States
Constitution, the section shall be implemented to the maximum extent
that federal law and the United States Constitution permit. Any provision
held invalid shall be severable from the remaining portions of this section.
Id.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Carlin I, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 564.
Id.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 3 1(d).
Id.
Volokh, supra note 13, at 1336, 1386.

102.

CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: GENERAL ELECTION

30-31 (Nov. 5, 1996) (discussing effect of the initiative on public schools).

Proposition209

[VOL. 38: 661, 2001]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

of settled expectations" that Volokh explains is protected by clause (d)

may be the settled expectations of parties to a contract. Consent decrees
are contractual in nature in that they are essentially judicially enforced

agreements." 3 As such, they may fall within the protection of the

contracts clause of the U.S. Constitution which provides that "No State
shall ...pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."' '
As a constitutional amendment, section 31 is a state action and is
therefore subject to the proscriptions of the contracts clause.'" It may be
that the drafters of Proposition 209 included clause (d), at least in part, to
preempt potential challenges to the initiative premised on a contract
clause violation. As stated by the Supreme Court, "[t]he obligations of a
contract are impaired by a law which renders them invalid, or releases or
extinguishes them.""' Absent clause (d), section 31 clearly has the
potential of disturbing the settled expectations and rights of the parties to

a consent decree. Therefore, school districts operating under a consent
decree may be able to assert the additional defense that an attack
premised on section 31 violates the contracts clause.'07
103.

BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY

411 (6th ed. 1990)

[A consent decree] is not properly a judicial sentence, but is in the nature of a
solemn contract or agreement of the parties, made under the sanction of the
court, and in effect an admission by them that the decree is a just determination
of their rights upon the real facts of the case ....It binds only the consenting
parties; and is not binding upon the court.

Id.
104. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.1. The California Constitution contains a nearly
identical provision which is functionally equivalent to the federal provision. Article I.
section 9 provides: "A... law impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed."
CAL. CoNsT. art. L § 9.
105. See 16B AM. JuR. 2D Constitutional Law § 734 (1998) ("Any enactment,
regardless of its source, to which a state gives the force of law is a law within the
meaning of this provision, and this includes.., state constitutions and constitutional
amendments.").
106. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398.431 (1934).
107. Walsh v. Bd. of Admin. of Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 118, 127
(Ct. App. 1992). The court outlined the requisite analysis for evaluating a contract
clause claim:
When a claim is presented under the contract clause three questions may arise.
First, it must be determined whether there is a valid contract to be impaired.
The contract clause does not protect expectations that are based upon contracts
that are invalid, illegal, unenforceable, or which arise without the giving of
consideration. Nor does the contract clause protect expectations which are
based upon legal theories other than contract, such as quasi-contract or
estoppel. Second, if a contract is found, it must be determined Whether a
challenged law is consistent with its express or implied terms. Modification of
contractual rights through subsequent legislation may be consistent with, rather

In light of the express language of section 31, it is somewhat
surprising that the court granted Groundswell's request for a new public
hearing on a matter that had been settled less than seven months earlier
by the same court and from which no appeal had been taken.'
As
mentioned above, Groundswell's request for a hearing was based
primarily upon the group's assertion that the district's integration plan
was in conflict with section 31 ." Specifically, Groundswell argued that
the VEEP and school choice programs ran afoul of section 31 "as they
provided for 'mandatory race balancing of classrooms' and 'racial
gerrymandering of school boundaries."""'
At the August, 1997, hearing, both the school district and the Carlin
class opposed any modification of the existing order on the grounds that
Groundswell had not appealed the final order and in essence sought
reconsideration of matters previously raised and rejected.'" Both parties
further argued that section 31 expressly excluded existing court orders
from its scope."'
The district also expressed grave concern that
termination of the integration plan would jeopardize a sizable amount
of state and federal integration funding that could not be replaced
without drastically affecting other school programs."' The thrust of
Groundswell's argument at the hearing was that the court's continuing
jurisdiction and maintenance of the final order prevented 4nonclass
constituents from exercising their civil rights under section 31."
While the court denied the motion to discharge the writ of mandate
and to modify the district's integration plan, it did move up the
termination date of court supervision from January 1, 2000, to July, 1,
1998, if the constitutionality of section 31 was upheld."' In so ruling,
than an impairment of, the contract of the parties. Finally, if impairment is
found, it must be determined whether the impairing law exceeds the bounds of
the constitutional limitations.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
108. See Carlin 11, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562, 564 (Ct. App, 1998).
109. Id.
110. Id. (quoting from Groundswell's ex parte petition for a hearing). "In support
[of their petition], Groundswell submitted two parents' statements claiming District's
plan hindered children from attending their nearest school." Id.
11. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 565. Specifically, the district stated that "$49 million in state integration
funds and $2 million in federal magnet integration funds" could be lost. Id.
114. Id. (quoting from the trial court record).
115. Id. at 565-66. The modified paragraph of the final order provides:
It is further provided that if on or before July 1, 1998 Proposition 209 has been
upheld as constitutional the date in paragraph 24 after which "the District's
failure to comply with the provisions of this Order will not constitute a
violation or contempt of this Order" shall be changed from "January 1, 2000"
to "July 1, 1998." If on July 1, 1998, the constitutionality of Proposition 209
has not yet been decided, and subsequent to July 1, 1998 Proposition 209 is
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the court noted that the district's demonstrated commitment to the
integration plan substantially diminished the need for continuing
jurisdiction in the case.' 6 But it is clear that the catalyst for accelerating
the end of jurisdiction in the case was Proposition 209.
First, the court questioned the school district's counsel as to whether
continuing the case and judicial control over the integration plan was

consistent with the underlying principles of section 31."

More

significantly, after noting that Proposition 209 represents the "voice of
the people," the court stated that section 31 "seems to be inconsistent
with a court-ordered program such as we have here.""' In the end, the
court justified the accelerated termination of jurisdiction on the grounds
that "supervision was no longer necessary" and that section 31
constitutes a "change of circumstance" from when the matter was heard
the previous year." 9
In basing its decision, even if only in part, on section 31, the superior
court erred. The language of clause (d) is simple and straightforward:
"Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as invalidating any court
order."
"' The meaning and intent of the clause is self-evident. In the
absence of ambiguity, it is inappropriate for a court to look beyond the
actual text to determine the scope or meaning of a legislative
provision.'
The established principles of statutory construction are
equally applicable to constitutional provisions.' As enunciated by the
California Supreme Court:
upheld as constitutional, the date in paragraph 24 shall be changed from
"January 1, 2000" to the date when the decision upholding the constitutionality
of Proposition 209 becomes final. If Proposition 209 is held to ba
unconstitutional, the date in paragraph 24 shall remain "January 1,2000."
Id. at 566 n.4.
116. Id. at 565.
The [trial] court stated: "I recall my comment a year ago on this case that it
appeared to me that the efforts to balance the schools to avoid isolation of
races or ethnic students in certain areas is a way of life with the school district.
It's done just automatically, almost like breathing .... [ [Wle watched it for
a year and there has been no call upon the Court for any ruling except
[Groundswell's] desire to make a few changes and to terminate."
Id. (quoting from the trial court record) (first alteration added).
117. Id.
118. Id. (quoting from the trial court record).
119. Id. at 565-66 (quoting from the trial court record).
120. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(d) (emphasis added).
121. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass'n v. City of San Diego, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 804,
807 (Ct. App. 1999).
122. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 787 P.2d 996,998 (Cal. 1990).

[In arriving at the meaning of a [constitutional provision], consideration must
be given to the words employed, giving to every word, clause and sentence their
ordinary meaning. If doubts and ambiguities remain then, and only then, are we
warranted in seeking elsewhere for aid .... When... "the language is clear and
unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to
indicia of the intent of the Legislature (in the case 2 f a statute) or of the voters
(in the case of a provision adopted by the voters)."

Granted, the court did not actually invalidate the district's integration
plan or discharge the writ of mandate; to do so on the grounds of section
31 would have been clearly impermissible. But even the line of
questioning as to whether continued judicial control over the district was
consistent with the principles behind section 31 was inappropriate. The
sole principle relating to section 31 that should have concerned the court
is that it did not apply-by its expressed terms-to existing court orders
in effect when it was enacted. 24 It follows that utilizing section 31 as a
stated rationale for ending court jurisdiction in the case was
inappropriate as well.'" The court,
in effect, gave greater breadth to
12 6
section 31 than the text provides.
The district brought a mandamus proceeding seeking to vacate the
superior court's order terminating jurisdiction, and the appellate court
issued an order to show cause on November 19, 1997.27 While
upholding the lower court's order, the appellate court was careful to step
back from the superior court's seeming endorsement of the applicability
of section 31 to court-ordered integration plans.' 28
The court
admonished:
The parties have attributed meaning and consequences to the court's order
which it simply does not have. The court did not say it was compelled by
Section 31 to end District's integration plan. Nor did the court say it was
ending the plan at all. Rather, it questioned the wisdom of the court, rather than
District and its constituents, controlling policy where there was no showing of a

123. Id. at 998-99 (citing Lungren v. Deukmejian, 755 P.2d 299, 303, 304 (Cal.
1988)) (other internal citations omitted).
124. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 (d).
125. This is not to say that there were not other justifications for terminating the
case-or even that continued judicial oversight was necessary. Indeed, ending the case
conforms with a growing trend of judicial skepticism toward long-term judicial oversight
of school desegregation programs and the court's increasing willingness to relinquish
control over the programs. Joondeph, supra note 42, at 170-71.
126. E.g., Howard Jarvis Taxpayers, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 807 (stating that a "court
may not add to [a] statute or rewrite it to conform to an assumed intent that is not
apparent in its language").
127. Carlin II, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562, 563, 566 (Ct. App. 1998). The Los Angeles
Unified School District and the California Voluntary Integration Association filed
amicus curiae briefs. Id. at 566. The SDUSD "and Carlin class also iled notices of
appeal." Id. at 566 n.5.
128. Id. at 563, 566.
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continuing need to supervise the plan.'

The court emphasized the propriety of ending judicial oversight and
the growing impetus to return control of integration programs back to
local officials and policy makers.'O' In support, the court cited the
Supreme Court's most recent pronouncements on the issue, Board of
Education v. Dowell' and Freeman v.Pitts,"2 which underscore the
temporary nature of judicial oversight of school desegregation programs.
These cases seem to "encourage" courts to relinquish control by giving
the courts broad discretion to determine that oversight is no longer
necessary.' 33 In short, the appellate court upheld the lower court's order
on the ground that the court had properly exercised its inherent

discretion to end judicial involvement in the case for the simple reason
that judicial oversight was no longer necessary, not because it was
compelled to do so by section 3 1.2"
By carefully framing its holding so as to "decouple" section 31 from

the lower court's decision to end jurisdiction in the case, the appellate
court tacitly acknowledged that section 31, by its very terms, does not

affect integration plans in this category."'

In short, desegregation or

integration plans which were subject to court order or consent decree at
the effective date of section 31 are not subject to its provisions."' These
programs are expressly exempt from the section's coverage by clause (d)

and any judicial interpretation 7to the contrary would violate the general
rules of statutory construction.'

129. Id. at 566. "The parties and amici curiae urge[d the court] to determine
Section 31's scope and effect" on not only court-ordered plans, but also on voluntary and
post-amendment integration plans. Id. In response, the court stated that "'[the broad

questions posed here were not before the superior court, were not briefed, and need not
be answered to resolve this proceeding." Id.
130. Id. at 566-67; see also Joondeph, supra note 38, at 149-50.
131. Carlin H,71 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 566 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237
(1991)).
132- Id. (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992)).
133. Id. at 566-67.
134. While it may be true that judicial oversight was no longer necessary, the court
may have neglected to address a relevant procedural issue. Specifically, one could argue
that the lower court's dismissal of Groundswell's equal protection and "racial
gerrymandering" claims, coupled with the appellate court's refusal to accept section 31
as an appropriate justification for ending the case, left Groundswell with no new grounds
for revisiting the August 16, 1996, final order, which therefore was res judicata to the
1997 order.
135. CarlinII, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 563,566.
136. CAL. CONST.art. I, § 31(d).
137. Id.

Two additional issues relating to desegregation programs arising
under court order or consent decree are worth discussing. First, does the
termination of court jurisdiction in a case thereby leave the associated
integration plan susceptible to the proscriptions of section 31 ? Finally,
does section 31 foreclose the future use of preferences in school
integration cases?
A. Applicability of Proposition209 when the Court
Terminates Jurisdiction
The resolution of this question involves two related inquiries. First,
does the underlying court order remain in effect after the court has quit
the case? Second, if the school district is no longer under court order, do
the prohibitions of section 31 subsequently attach to the associated
integration plan? In Carlin H, the court made it clear that ending the
case affected neither the court order nor the integration plan."' "The
[superior] court's August 1996 order directed District to continue and to
increase its integration programs and goals. Significantly, no party
appealed that order and it remains viable with only the supervision end
date modified."'39 Subsequent to the Carlin I decision, Groundswell
again brought a motion to discharge the original writ of mandate."' This
time, the superior court ordered the discharge of the March, 1977, writ,
but added that the court's 1996 final order directing the continuation of
the district's integration program "remains viable."' 4 ' The same result
was apparently reached when the Los Angeles Superior Court
terminated its supervision over the Los Angeles Unified School
District's desegregation plan in 1981.42 The court's final order "did not
relieve the Los Angeles USD of its duty to address racial isolation or
continue the desegregation plan.' 43 Presumably then, if a court order
terminating jurisdiction also approves the existing integration plan or
directs its continuance, the affected school district is still technically
operating under a court order. In such a case, it is clear that the
underlying integration plan continues to be exempt from section 31.
Even if it were determined that a court order terminates when a court
ends its jurisdiction in the case, it is still unlikely that section 31 would
attach at that point. Clause (d) speaks only to court orders and consent
138. CarlinI,71 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 567-68.
139. Id. at 567.
140. Order on Order to Show Cause Granting Discharge of Writ of Mandate at 2.
Carlin v. Bd. of Educ. (1998) (No. 303800) (hereinafter CarlinIII).
141. Id.
142. Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Petitioner at 4, Carlin 11, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d
562 (Cal. 1998) (No. D029639).
143. Id.

[VOL. 38: 661,2001]

Proposition209

SAN DIEGO L.'W RE'VIE
decrees in place at the effective date of the initiative.'" Thus, the
determinant factor is simply whether the court order or consent decree
was viable when section 31 became effective. Clause (b), which limits
the application of section 31 to action taken after its effective date,
accomplishes this same result.' In either case, the integration plan is
effectively "grandfathered-in" and is unaffected by section 31 .1'
B. Use of Preferences in FutureRemedial Schemes
The fact that clause (d) only refers to court orders or decrees in force
as of the effective date of this provision could imply that section 31 is
intended to cover prospective court orders or consent decrees."
However, assuming this was the drafter's actual intent and, further, that

California voters approved Proposition 209 with this understanding,
there are fundamental constitutional constraints that prevent section 31

from being given such force. It is well settled law that otherwise valid
state laws must give way when necessary to vindicate a federally
recognized right.'" As one court noted:
Once a court has found a federal constitutional or statutory violation... a state
law cannot prevent a necessary remedy. Under the Supremacy Clause, the
federal remedy prevails. "To hold otherwise would fail to take account of the
obligations of local governments, under the Supremacy Clause, to fulfill the
requirements that the Constitution imposes upon them.

In school desegregation cases, the federal right flows from the Equal
Protection Clause' which has been interpreted to guarantee the right to
144. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(d).
145. ML § 31(b).
146. Although the result is the same, the means of arriving at that conclusion may
have funding ramifications. Specifically, if it is determined that a school district is no

longer under court order, it may loose eligibility for the state's reimbursement program
which covers costs mandated by courts. CAL EDUC. CODE § 42243.6 (West 1993 &
Supp.2000).
147. CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 31(b).
148. E.g. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 57 (1990) (holding that a "taxing
authority may be ordered to levy taxes in excess of the limit set by state statute where
there is reason based in the Constitution for not observing the statutory limitation");
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,45 (1971) (stating that "state
policy must give way when it operates to hinder vindication of federal constitutional
guarantees"); Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 216 (7th Cir. 1995)
(observing that once a federal violation is found, "a state law cannot prevent a necessary
remedy").
149. Perkins, 47 F.3d at 216 (citing Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 57).
150. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

attend a nonsegregated school. 5' In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education, the Court stated that "if a state-imposed limitation
on a school authority's discretion operates to inhibit or obstruct the
operation of a unitary school system or impede the disestablishing of a
dual school system, it must fall; state policy must give way when it
operates to hinder vindication of federal constitutional guarantees.""' In
Missouri v. Jenkins (1990), the Court upheld the extraordinary measure
of a federal court ordering a school district to levy taxes to pay for a
court-ordered desegregation remedy.'
In so doing, the court enjoined
the operation of a Missouri law which would have prevented the school
district from assessing such a tax. "'
In the present setting, upon a finding of de jure segregation or racial
isolation, any proposed remedial scheme will invariably involve the use
of racial "preferences" in one way or another. If a court has the power to
order a school district to levy taxes in excess of that which is allowed
under state law in order to vindicate a federal right, it stands to reason
that a court is certainly able to require or approve the use of
"preferences" notwithstanding section 31. Consequently, if a court
interpreted section 31 in a way that obstructed the application of a
remedy deemed necessary under federal law, section 31 would be
unconstitutional as applied.
Not surprisingly, this result is supported by a panel of constitutional
law scholars who conducted a preliminary analysis of Proposition 209
for the California Senate Research Office. "5 The panel concluded that
Proposition 209 cannot forbid 56remedies required by federal law, whether
in state or federal court cases.1
IV. PROPOSITION 209 AND VOLUNTARY INTEGRATION
PROGRAMS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

To begin, section 31 should not affect voluntary integration programs
that were in place when California voters approved the initiative. As
with pre-existing court orders and consent decrees, pre-existing
voluntary integration programs were simply written out of the effective
2
provisions of section 31 .'
Section 31(b) clearly provides that the
section is only applicable to action taken after the section's effective
151.
152.
153.
154.

Brown 1,347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Swann, 402 U.S. at 45.
Jenkins,495 U.S. at 57.
Id.

155. KATE SPROUL, CAL. SENATE OFF. RES., THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
PROPOSED CALIFORNIA CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE 15 (1995).

156.
157.

Id.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(b), (d).
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date.'58 Thus, any programs already in place when Proposition 209 was

approved are shielded from its reach.

Again, the general rules of

statutory construction apply and any judicial interpretation that
circumvents clause (b) would be legally untenable."w As one court

stated: "Absent ambiguity, we presume that the voters intend the
meaning apparent on the face of an initiative measure and the court may
not add to the statute or rewrite
6 it to conform to an assumed intent that is
not apparent in its language."2'

1

However, the treatment of voluntary programs not already in place at
the initiative's effective date is an open question. Part of the difficulty
in answering this question lies in the lack of definition and potential
ambiguities in the wording of section 31 itself. As a general policy
statement, section 31 is straightforward and clear- "The state shall not

discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or
group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the
operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting.' ' But like other constitutional provisions, its application

may give rise to varied interpretations, and in the end may be anything
but straightforward. There are a number of unanswered questions.
Most significantly, section 31 does not define either "preferential
treatment" or "preference." 64 Arguably, a reasonable explanation for the
failure to define preference is simply that, given the common

understanding of the word and its ordinary usage, no further elaboration
was necessary.'6

Webster's Dictionary defines preference simply as

"the act, fact, or principle of giving advantages to some over others."''"
158. Id. § 31(b) ("This section shall apply only to action taken after the section's
effective date.").
159. Of course, any subsequent action involving a pre-existing program may trigger
section 31. Volokh, supra note 13, at 1386 ("Any hiring, admissions, or contracting
decisions made before the effective date are unaffected, though... subsequent [actions
which are related] ... have to be neutral.").
160. See supra Part II (analyzing statutory construction).
161. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass'n v. City of San Diego. 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 804.
807 (Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Lungren v. Superior Court, 926 P.2d 1042. 1046 (Cal.
1996)).
162. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a).
163. For a complete discussion of these interpretations, see cases cited supra note 3.
164. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a).
165. Black's Law Dictionary does not provide any assistance either, it fails to
define preference as used within this context. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 815. 816 (6th
ed. 1990).
166. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 927 (9th ed. 1989).

Logically, a "preference" connotes the use of any distinctive trait or
characteristic in such a way that a possessor of that trait or characteristic
is viewed more favorably than an individual who does not possess the
trait. In Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose,161 the
California Supreme Court appears to endorse such a broad interpretation
of the term when it quotes approvingly from the lower court's decision.
"[T]he term 'preferential treatment' ... viewed in its ordinary, natural
sense, refers to any kind of treatment favoring one group or individual
over another. The prohibition is not limited to set-asides, quotas, and
'plus factors,' but extends to all preferences granted to the target
groups."'"'
Accordingly, the use of race or ethnicity as a qualifying
factor'69 in busing, school assignment, school choice, or magnet
programs would appear to constitute a preference. But as every firstyear law student quickly learns, the use of even simple terms in a legal
context may give rise to nuances and shades of meaning where none
seemingly existed before. There is reputable authority that the use of
racial criteria in a school
desegregation setting does not necessarily
70
constitute a preference.
Courts have distinguished school desegregation and integration
programs in a primary and secondary education setting from affirmative
action programs in general.'7 ' For example, in Coalition for Economic
Equity v. Wilson, the Ninth Circuit Court stated:
We have recognized, however, that "'stacked deck' programs [such as racebased 'affirmative action'] trench on Fourteenth Amendment values in ways
that 'reshuffle' programs [such as school desegregation] do not." Unlike racial
preference programs, school desegregation programs are not inherently
invidious, do not work wholly to the benefit of certain members of one group
and correspondingly to the harm
72 of certain members of another group, and do
not deprive citizens of rights.'

Consequently, courts may be willing to construe school integration
programs as fundamentally different from other programs that grant
"preferential treatment," and thereby avoid triggering section 31.
Indeed, there are compelling reasons for distinguishing and carving out
special treatment for school integration programs.

167. 12 P.3d 1068 (Cal. 2000).
168. Id. at 1072 (quoting from the California Court of Appeal's decision).
169. The phrase "qualifying factor" is intended to mean any use of race in this
context, whether it is the sole criteria used or is merely one of many factors considered
by a school district.
170. 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 18.10, at 399 (3d ed. 1999).

171. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 708 (9th Cir. 1997).
172. Id. at 707 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors v. San Francisco Unified Sch.
Dist., 616 F.2d 1381, 1387 (9th Cir. 1980)) (alterations in original).
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First, courts have historically afforded special consideration to
primary and secondary education and the devastating affects of
segregation in this setting.'3 As the Supreme Court stated in Brown h
Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high
schools. To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
7#
communiy
undone.1 that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be

This sentiment was echoed by the California Supreme Court in
Crawford I, which spoke of the "fundamental importance of education"
and the "distinctive
racial harm traditionally inflicted by segregated
75

education.',

The court stated that "the importance of adopting and

implementing policies which avoid 'racially specific' harm to minority

groups takes on special constitutional significance with respect to the
field of education, because, at least in this state, education has been
explicitly recognized for equal protection purposes as a 'fundamental
interest." 76 These factors were deemed so compelling that the court
extended a school district's duty to desegregate to include situations
involving de facto segregation or racial isolation.'"
Additionally, there is an obvious need for flexibility in light of the
broad constitutional mandate facing California school districts to remedy
racial isolation. Under California law, the equal protection duty
173. See supra Part II.A-B; see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1973) (highlighting the importance of public education in general).
Justice Powell revisited the language from the landmark decision in Brown I, noting:
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to
our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life
if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to
all on equal terms.
Id. (quoting Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). Justice Powell went on to note, -This
theme, expressing an abiding respect for the vital role of education in a free society, may
be found in numerous opinions of Justices of this Court writing both before and after
Brown was decided." Md at 30.
174. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494.
175. Crawford I, 551 P.2d 28, 39 (Cal. 1976).
176. Id. at 38-39 (citing Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971)).
177. Id. at 30.

imposed upon school districts is greater than that imposed upon other
public entities, for it is only in the public school setting that de facto
segregation must be remedied.'
Even in the absence of court
involvement, school districts have an affirmative duty to combat de facto
segregation or racial isolation.'79
Given this mandate, affected school districts should be afforded the
means necessary for carrying it out. Requiring California school
districts to remedy de facto segregation or racial isolation while
simultaneously proscribing the use of racial criteria within the context of
this remedy would put these districts in an untenable position. Further,
if section 31 is interpreted to be broadly applicable to voluntary
integration programs, individuals seeking to vindicate their
constitutional rights as defined in CrawfordI would be forced to resort
to the courts. In short, if Crawford I remains good law, the mandate it
creates appears to be irreconcilable with the prohibitions of section 31.
Finally, there is a strong thread of case law and legal commentary
which suggests that integration efforts in primary and secondary
education are fundamentally different from affirmative action programs
in an employment or higher education setting. The later two settings
involve so-called "stacked deck" or "zero-sum" affirmative action
programs.'s With such programs, there is a clear "winner" and "loser."
Anytime someone is hired or granted admission through an affirmative
action program, someone else is correspondingly denied the opportunity
to be employed in that particular position or enrolled in that particular
university.' 8 ' In contrast, it has been asserted that all children reap the
benefits from integration programs and no child is denied access to a
public education. 2 As one constitutional law treatise states:
Voluntary measures to end de facto school segregation in elementary and high
schools by use of racial classifications and integration programs have been
upheld consistently by both federal and state courts. These situations may be
differentiated from preferential admissions to professional schools because all
students are provided83 with a public education and no person has a right to attend
segregated schools.

178. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 64-78 and
accompanying text (questioning the continued validity of the more stringent equal
protection requirements under California law).
179. Crawford 1, 551 P.2d at 30.
180. Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 616 F. 2d 1381,
1387 (9th Cir. 1980).
181. Sean Pager, Is Busing Preferential?-An Interpretive Analysis of Proposition
209, 21 WHITnER L. REV.3, 36-37 (1999).
182. Id.
183. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 170, at 399. The text does acknowledge that
"some students may suffer because they are no longer able to attend the best schools,"
but concludes (not altogether convincingly) that "schools should be relatively equal
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This was precisely the position taken in Coalition for Economic
Equity by California Attorney General Dan Lungren. t" Specifically,
Lungren argued that "'[b]using' and 'student assignment' on the basis of
race" is not covered by the CCRI because it does not "intol'e]
preferences."" Lungren's position is instructive given that he was an
outspoken advocate for Proposition 209 and was one of the signatories
to the pro-209 ballot arguments."' Presumably, the current Attorney
General, Bill Lockyer, who argued for a more flexible interpretation of
"preferential treatment" in Hi-Voltage, will maintain this position. "
The main difficulty with this position is that it requires an
interpretation that school desegregation programs are impliedly exempt
from the reach of section 31. There is simply no assurance that a court
will find such an implied exemption. Professor Volokh-in essence
asserting that a "preference" is a "preference"-argues strenuously that
such programs are clearly covered by section 3 1.
[Pirograms that provide academic assistance to all black or Hispanic students.
but only to those Asian or white students who are economically disadvantaged,
are barred. Though there are people of all races among their beneficiaries, they
still treat applicants differently based on race. Likewise, an ethnically based
assignment of a student to a particular public school is prohibited-though the
student would in any eveat go to some school, he is treated differently based on
race in school selection.

The most compelling evidence that the use of race as a factor in a
voluntary integration setting may constitute "preferential treatment" is

found in the Proposition 209 ballot materials.

Specifically, the

legislative analyst suggested that Proposition 209 may affect the funding
within a school district." Id.
184. Volokh, supranote 13, at 1344 (citing Appellants' Reply Brief at 9-10, 14 n.6.
Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997) (Nos. 97-150315031)).
185. ld. (emphasis added).
186. CAL SEC'Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMIPHLET: GrNER.XL ELECTION
30-31 (Nov. 5, 1996).
187. Attorney General Lockyer, representing the State of California. filed an amicus
curiae brief on behalf of the City of San Jose. Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of
San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1069 (Cal. 2000). See also David Kravets, Justices: Prop. 209
Bans Contract Preferences, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Sept. 7, 2000. available at
http'//wvvw.ocregister.com/politicsl7prop209cci.shtml (noting that Attorney General
Lockyer personally argued in defense of San Jose's MBE/WBE outreach program).
188. Volokh, supra note 13, at 1343-44 (internal footnotes omitted). "Clause (a)
thus does indeed 'prohibit all race-conscious' (and sex-conscious) decisions, forbidding
any 'differen[ce]' in 'treat[ment]' based on race, sex, color, ethnicity, and national origin
in public employment, education, or contracting." Id. at 1343 (citation omitted).

for voluntary integration programs.
[T]he measure could eliminate, or cause fundamental changes to, voluntary
desegregation programs run by school districts .... Examples of desegregation
spending that could be affected by the measure include the special funding
given to (1) "magnet" schools (in those cases where race or ethnicity are
preferential factors in the admission of students to the schools) and (2)
designated "racially isolated minority. schools"
" "e
189 that are located in areas with
high proportions of racial or ethnic minorities.

While a position asserted by the legislative analyst in sample ballot
materials is nonbinding, it is given weight in circumstances where the
actual language of a statute or constitutional provision is ambiguous.'
As the court in Hi-Voltage noted, these "extrinsic aids" may also be used
to test a court's construction of a statute or constitutional provision in
instances where the language of the text is clear. 9' Indeed, after first
declaring that "the language of Proposition 209 is clear and literally
interpreted does not lead to absurd results," the Hi-Voltage court drew
liberally from the Proposition 209 ballot materials, particularly the
Legislative Analyst's report, in finding that San Jose's outreach program
for women- and minority-owned businesses violated section 31.' " In
essence, the court rationalized that if it was not abundantly clear from
the text of section 31 that the outreach program in question constituted
"preferential treatment," the fact that the analyst's report singled out
such programs as potentially impacted by the provision removed any
remaining doubt as to its applicability.
Given the Hi-Voltage court's literal interpretation of "preferential
treatment" and the fact that the analyst also singled out voluntary school
integration programs as potentially impacted, the search for an implied
exception for such programs could prove to be in vain. In the end, this
question will undoubtedly be decided in court. Given the need for
flexibility in light of the constitutional mandate to address racial
isolation, a school district should be able to at least make a case that
voluntary integration programs should be impliedly exempt from section
31.
V. CONCLUSION

While Proposition 209 has indelibly changed the face of affirmative
189. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: GENERAL ELECTION
30-31 (Nov. 5, 1996) (discussing effect of the initiative on public schools).
190. San Francisco Taxpayers Ass'n v. Bd. of Supervisors, 828 P.2d 147, 153 (Cal.
1992); Carman v. Alvord, 644 P.2d 192, 199 (Cal. 1982).
191. Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1082 (Cal.
2000).
192. Id. at 1082-85.
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action in California, its effect on primary and secondary school
integration programs may not be as sweeping as it is in the areas of
public employment and higher education. School integration programs
in place at the effective date of the initiative or which arise under court
order or consent decree are simply not covered by section 31 -and the
canons of statutory construction should preclude any judicial
interpretation to the contrary. As for purely voluntary integration
programs implemented after the effective date of the initiative, there is
room for legitimate debate. Arguably, these programs should also be
exempt from section 31. However, the California Supreme Court's
recent decision in Hi-Voltage does not bode well for finding such an
implied exemption.
Notwithstanding the growing judicial skepticism toward affirmative
action"' and the growth of voter-initiated anti-affirmative action
measures, such as Proposition 209 and Washington state's Initiative
200,'" recent polls and studies have shown that Americans
overwhelmingly oppose racial segregation and support the underlying
goals of diversity.
If the courts ultimately determine that voluntary
integration programs are covered by section 31, there are alternatives
available for furthering the goals of diversity and racial integration that
are beyond the reach of its provisions. Section 31 proscribes only
preferences based on race, sex, color, etinicity, or national origin;' a
school district remains free to employ preferences based on other criteria
in making enrollment decisions. Schools could simply use race-neutral
factors such as socio-economic status or geography as proxies in
furthering integration efforts. 97 Admittedly, the use of race-neutral
193. See supra Part11.
194. Initiative 200, which is similar to Proposition 209, was approved by
Washington voters in November, 1998. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60A00,
49.60A01 (West Supp. 2001).
initiative treatment
states in relevant
part that "Itihe
stateonshall
preferential
to, any individual
or group
the
not discriminate against, or grantThe
basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public
employment, public education, or public contracting." Id. § 49.60A00(a) (West Supp.
2001).
195. Crenshaw, supra note 14, at 204 n.23.
196. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a).
197. The recent decision of the San Diego Unified School District to modify its
voluntary integration program is a good example of the use of other criteria in promoting
diversity. The San Diego proposal simply eliminated all use of racial criteria in its
school choice and magnet programs-and instead relies on geographic factors. San
Diego City Schools: Draft Proposal for Magnet and VEEP Eligibility (Sept. 22, 1999).
For the reasons discussed in this Comment, this modification was unnecessary. San

selection criteria is an imperfect vehicle for promoting racial
integration. 9 ' However, this approach is certainly viable and should be
pursued by school districts when faced with the alternative of doing
nothing and leaving school integration to chance.
NEIL S. HYYTINEN

Diego's integration plan fits squarely within two of the express exemptions of section 3 1,
and was therefore beyond its reach.
198. CHILLING ADMISSIONS, supra note 7, at 33-50.

